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Transboundary water resource governance is premised on equitable water and water-
related benefit sharing. Using the case of the Blue Nile (Ethiopia and Sudan), we explore 
the  conceptual  issues  that  need  consideration  in  the  crafting  of  cross-border 
cooperation  within  the  water  sector.  First,  drawing  on  global  experiences  with 
transboundary  water  management,  we  evaluate  how  upstream  and  downstream 
concerns are addressed by transboundary water management institutions. Second, we 
explore the kinds of institutional design and the issues which need to be considered to 
result in ‘win-win’ scenarios for both upstream and downstream users, as well as the 
mechanisms of benefit sharing negotiated amongst different stakeholders. Third, we 
examine  ways  of  addressing  equity  and  livelihoods  in  transboundary  institutional 
arrangements. Finally, we attempt to assess how transboundary institutions can address 
broader historical, political and economic issues and their implications for sustainable 
transboundary  water  governance.  This  paper  raises  key  issues  that  need  to  be 





According  to  IWMI‘s  2006  Comprehensive  Assessment  Report,  water  scarcity  (both 
physical and economic) is a major concern for developing countries in their effort to 
move out of poverty and meet the Millennium Development Goals (Molden 2007). The 
Comprehensive Assessment also argues that with the current global water demands and 
the increasing population, the demand for water will outstrip the available and potential 
water resources if the current water development model is continued. Furthermore, water 
resources do not coincide with administrative or political boundaries. Consequently, there 
is a need to go beyond national interests and engage in transboundary water cooperation.  
This paper is based on the ongoing upstream-downstream project which is being carried 
out  by  IWMI  and  its  partners  in  Ethiopia  and  Sudan.  This  project  covers  the 
transboundary Blue Nile River, which is known as the Abbay in Ethiopia. Transboundary Water Governance Institutional Architecture: Reflections from Ethiopia 
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The  concept  of  transboundary  natural  resources  management  is  strongly  related  to 
‗bioregionalism‘,  which  views  the  world  as  consisting  of  contiguous  but  discrete 
‗bioregions‘  with  the  boundaries  of  each  bioregion  defined  by  nature  rather  than 
legislation or political expedience (cf. Wolmer 2003). According to Tessera ―The Nile 
River  Basin  in  general  hosts  problems  which  call  for  regional  or  sub-regional 
cooperation‖  (Tessera  2006:  44)‖  The  severe  erosion  in  the  upper  catchments  of  the 
Abbay/Blue  Nile  River  Basins  has  impacts  downstream  within  and  across  political 
borders. Since river basin problems cut across political borders, cooperation across the 
Nile River Basin is necessary. In river basin management, absolute sovereignty does not 
work since transboundary cooperation is needed. Sudan, for instance, views upstream 
reservoirs in Ethiopia as being an efficient way to control floods and an efficient way to 
store water as it reduces loss of water through evaporation in either Sudan or Egypt 
which have higher temperatures compared to Ethiopia. The Wall Street Journal adds that 
‗Engineers  from  both  countries  agree  that  dams  in  the  cool  and  moist  Ethiopian 
highlands, storing water in deep natural gorges, would lose far less water to evaporation 
than  the  Aswan  Dam  in  the  hot,  dry  Egyptian  desert.  They  calculate  the  savings  on 
evaporation  could  compensate  for  the  amount  of  water  Ethiopia  proposes  to  use  for 
irrigation‘ (The Wall Street Journal 23 November 2003). 
 
The  Nile  Basin  Initiative  is  an  attempt  to  promote  an  Integrated  Water  Resource 
Management approach within the Blue Nile River Basin. This is based on the realization 
that  sedimentation  and  siltation  of  dams  and  reservoirs  downstream  is  a  function  of 
upstream land uses. The increased frequency and magnitude of drought in the Ethiopian 
Highlands has also affected the quality and quantity of water downstream in Sudan and 
Egypt (cf. Tessera 2006). The impact of environmental degradation is forcing countries to 
cooperate in order to address ‗common dangers‘ which cannot be effectively addressed 
without the cooperation of other countries. Tessera (2006) notes that the impact of land 
degradation in the sub-basin can hardly be solved by any means other than cooperative 
watershed  management.  Silt  accumulation  in  the  Roseires  Dam  in  Sudan  is  largely 
attributed to the upstream activities in the Ethiopian Highlands. The Atbara and Blue Nile 
are said to contribute 53% of seasonal waters but contribute 90% of the sediment in the 
Nile (Tessera 2006). Sedimentation is also negatively affecting the Sennar and Aswan 
Dams and the related irrigation schemes. The Upstream-Downstream project has found 
that total storage loss in Sennar due to sedimentation is 660 Mm3 (i.e. 70% of its original 
capacity) since the dam was built in 1925 and for Roseires is 1,200 Mm3 (i.e. 40% of 
original capacity) since the dam was built in 1964 (Field visit 22-27 February 2008). 
Despite  sedimentation  being  bad  for  most  dams  and  water  reservoirs,  in  Egypt  the 
building of the Aswan High Dam has further denied downstream farmers the rich silt 
which made the Nile valley very productive. This complicates assessment of costs and 
benefits of upstream downstream water users within a river basin. 
 
Downstream  impacts  of  sedimentation  include  reduced  benefits  from  irrigation, 
hydropower,  navigation,  water  quality,  water  quantity,  flood  control,  fishing,  and 
recreation. Poor water quality will result in more expensive water purification methods 
such as the special filters for the Khartoum water supply (Shapland 1997). Removal of Transboundary Water Governance Institutional Architecture: Reflections from Ethiopia 
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sediment in Sudan‘s reservoirs and related irrigation schemes accounts for half of the 
operation and maintenance budget (cf. Ahmed 2000; Conway 2000). Sudan is further 
spending US$800 million in flood mitigation measures. If mechanism could be put in 
place upstream which would result in the reduction of, say, the flood mitigation budget, 
Sudan may be willing to contribute financially towards sustainable upstream watershed 
management costs. The Payment for Environmental Services (PES) component of this 
study has found out that farmers are largely willing to pay in kind – rather than in cash 
for  improved  upstream  land  and  water  management  which  benefits  the  downstream 
dwellers (Alemayehu et al. 2008). 
 
Steps towards transboundary cooperation 
 
Attempts at cooperation and benefit sharing within the Blue Nile Basin go back to the 
1960s. The 1959 Water Sharing Agreement allocated the Nile waters as follows: Egypt 
66%, Sudan 22% and surface evaporation and surface seepage at High Aswan Dam at 
12%. Ethiopia was not included in this water sharing agreement, nor were the other basin 
countries (FAO 2007, p.8). 
 
In  1967  the  Hydrometeorological  Survey  of  the  Equatorial  Lakes  (Hydromet)  was 
launched with the support of the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP), with the 
primary objective of enhancing the collection of hydro meteorological data. Hydromet 
operated until 1992. In 1993 the Technical Cooperation Commission for the Promotion 
and  Development  of  the  Nile  (TECCONILE)  was  formed  whose  intention  was  to 
promote  development  (World  Bank  2005).  In  1993,  the  Canadian  International 
Development  Agency  (CIDA)  funded  10  Nile  2002  Conferences  which  aimed  at 
promoting dialogue and cooperation within the Nile Basin. In 1995 CIDA supported the 
development of a Nile Basin action plan under the auspices of TECCONILE.  In 1997 the 
Nile Basin Council of Ministers requested the World Bank to lead and coordinate their 
donor activities (World Bank 2005). In 1997, with UNDP support, the riparian countries 
also established a forum for dialogue on a ‗Cooperative Framework‘ for the Nile Basin, 
with three representatives from each riparian country.  
 
In February 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative succeeded the TECCONILE. The NBI was 
spearheaded by the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin states (Nile 
Council of Ministers or Nile-COM). ‗The NBI seeks to develop the river in a cooperative 
manner,  share  substantial  socioeconomic  benefits,  and  promote  regional  peace  and 
security. The NBI started with a participatory process of dialogue among the riparian 
countries  that  resulted  in  their  agreeing  on  a  shared  vision:  to  achieve  sustainable 
socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the 
common Nile Basin water resources, and a Strategic Action Program to translate this 
vision into concrete activities and projects‘ (World Bank 2005).  
 
Institutional Design Issues  
 Transboundary Water Governance Institutional Architecture: Reflections from Ethiopia 
and Sudan 
249 
CP 19 Project Workshop Proceedings 
Transboundary River Basin institutions must represent the interests of the member states 
without bias. This will result in the transboundary institutions acquiring legitimacy and 
the necessary support. 
Enabling policies and institutions should be in place to be able to monitor and enforce 
compliance. The institutions carrying out this exercise must have meaningful powers but 
they must also be accountable to both the upstream and downstream water users, with 
higher level institutions having oversight powers only.  It is important to recognize that 
the need to satisfy societal requirements has expanded beyond the objective of simply 
water supply. Increasingly a diversity of concerned parties and organizations seek input 
into water related decision-making processes.  The downstream and upstream water users 
need to participate actively, not only in the first negotiation process, but also in the fine-
tuning of the transboundary water management arrangements over time.  
 
Transboundary water governance institutions must not be disconnected from local level 
institutions. This entails that there must be nested institutional arrangements where small 
local  institutions  form  the  building  blocks,  which  come  together  to  create  larger 
management  institutions.  Thus  multiple  layers  of  management  that  link  small-scale 
interactions  to  larger,  and  ultimately  basin  scale  actions.    Experiences  elsewhere 
demonstrate that there tends to be a disconnection between the river basin management 
institutions and the water users who are supposed to be served by the transboundary 
water  management  institutions.  For  instance,  at  societal  level,  the  Mekong  River 
Commission remains far removed from the basin water users (Hirsch 2006). 
 
Experiences from the southern Africa region through the Southern African Development 
Community  (SADC)  Protocol  on  Shared  Watercourse  Systems  and  its  subsequent 
amendments has helped to de-securitize the issue of transboundary water management 
(Turton 2008; Ramoeli, 2002) and enabled Transboundary water management institutions 
to be viewed as part of regional integration. 
 
An institutionalized transboundary knowledge database is  an important component of 
sharing knowledge and resulting in confidence in the data used by the transboundary 
institutions. The data is available to all stakeholders. In the Nile River Basin – the Nile 
Basin  Initiative is attempting to do that. The southern African countries have similar 
initiatives for the Limpopo and Zambezi River Basins (Turton 2008; Ramoeli 2002). The 
Volta  Basin  Technical  Committee  also  includes  all  the  six  riparian  countries  in  data 
collection and validation (Lautze et al. 2008). 
 
Benefit sharing in transboundary water governance 
 
Whilst benefit sharing seems to have made significant strides theoretically, there are still 
a number of operational issues which need to be resolved in the context of benefit sharing 
in transboundary water governance. In this paper, benefit sharing is viewed as offering 
flexibility to riparians to separate the physical distribution of river development (where 
activities are undertaken), from the economic distribution of benefits (who receives the 
benefits of those activities.) This allows riparians to focus firstly on generating basin-
wide  benefits  (a  positive-sum  exercise),  and  secondly  on  sharing  those  benefits  in  a Transboundary Water Governance Institutional Architecture: Reflections from Ethiopia 
and Sudan 
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manner that is agreed as fair (see Sadoff and Grey 2005; cf. Turton 2008). Research 
findings in the Upstream-Downstream study have to be juxtaposed to the wealth of global 
experience on benefit sharing (Sadoff and Grey 2002, 2005; Yu 2007). The Payment for 
Environmental  Services  (PES)  results  under  the  upstream-downstream  project  are  an 
important move in that direction. Benefit sharing takes place at various scales and levels. 
In  Ethiopia  for  instance,  it  may  vary  from  a  small  watershed  project,  to  regional 
government, which may or may not coincide with hydrological zones, going up to the 
transboundary level where international law and conventions begin to apply.  
 
Who benefits and who loses from benefit sharing – some studies from Latin America are 
beginning to caution that benefits can potentially accrue to the most powerful whilst not 
addressing the needs of the poor and female headed households. An understanding of the 
power relationships at different scales will help inform the structuring of benefit sharing. 
In the Senegal River Basin, for instance, an artificial river flood is provided each year in 
order to support local livelihoods (UNESCO 2003). 
 
How do you develop sustainable and targeted funding mechanism which will be used to 
‗compensate‘  those  bearing  the  costs  of  watershed  and  transboundary  river  basin 
management? Selling electricity at a cheaper price to the upstream country might benefit 
the country as a whole – but not the specific watershed community. This might result in 
poorly targeted incentives which might not reward the poor upstream farmers who are 
bearing the cost of upstream river basin management.  How are the payments going to be 
made? Should the reward be for only good management or also for actively improving 
the upstream areas within the river basin?  Who pays and for what? (Poras and Grieg-
Gran, 2007). Most current transboundary benefit sharing initiatives are largely funded by 
donors and non-governmental organizations.  
 
Upstream-downstream  cooperation  delves  into  broader  international  relations  and 
political economy issues. What makes transboundary basin level management successful? 
What  is  the  power  balance  amongst  the  states  that  are  involved  (Hegemony,  neo-
hegemony or realisms in international cooperation)? Transboundary Basin Management 
in  the Blue Nile seems to  indicate power asymmetry that might  be reflected in  who 
shapes  what  is  considered  ‗knowledge‘.  Despite  the  establishment  of  ENTRO, 
‗scientific‘5 data still seem to be contested and hardly shared (although this could be 
improving). Confidence building and establishing trust will need to take place first before 
detailed discussions on benefit sharing (cf. Sadoff and Grey 2005). 
 
Transboundary benefit sharing presents different benefit sharing matrices in which water 
allocation need not be the only potential benefit. It is possible to share benefits from 
water without sharing the actual water (cf. Sadoff and Grey 2005). Within the Blue Nile 
this is still a contested issue which needs to be resolved especially in light of the 1959 
Water  Sharing  Agreement  between  Egypt  and  Sudan.  Any  transboundary  river  basin 
management has to be grounded within the specific political and historical settings rather 
than being an imposition of blue print solutions (cf. Merrey et al 2007).  
                                                      
5 Scientific data especially concerning the Nile can easily be politically ‘tainted’ in order to reflect the 
various country positions? Transboundary Water Governance Institutional Architecture: Reflections from Ethiopia 
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Finally, transboundary benefit sharing is premised on the assumption that it‘s feasible to 
establish these costs and benefits. In most river basins good practices take a lot of time to 
produce results and this is further complicated by natural phenomenon such as climate 
change  and  changing  rainfall  patterns  which  also  potentially  contribute  towards  land 
degradation.  Establishing  causality  in  most  river  basins  causes  a  lot  of  difficulties. 
‗Values‘ are also normative, and largely depend on the specific contexts and communities 
and it is often difficult to have a common understanding across sub-national level – let 
alone  international  boundaries.  The  physical  size  of  the  basin  means  that  local  level 
institutions dealing with local issues often find it difficult to acknowledge issues facing 
others in the basin, who may be located many hundreds of kilometers away, and for 




While transboundary water governance is the way forward for an integrated approach to 
water  management,  there  are  number  of  issues  that  such  an  institutional  architecture 
needs to address. For the fluid ‗benefits beyond boundaries‘ to be meaningful to all the 
individual  countries  involved,  the  issue  of  benefit  sharing  mechanisms  need  to  be 
critically reviewed in practice. Equity has also to be assessed at various levels from the 
transboundary to the local level. Will equity at the transboundary level necessarily imply 
equity  at  local  level?  How  can  all  the  stakeholders‘  maxmize  the  benefits  whilst 
minimizing the costs. Finally, transboundary institutional architecture has to be grounded 
in  the  water  historical  trajectories.  How  do  you  deal  with  past  agreements  on  water 
sharing  while  moving  forward  with  one  shared  vision  on  transboundary  water 
management? This is a further complex equity issue which addresses the weight that 




This paper presents conceptual issues from the ongoing CP19  -  Improved Water and 
Land  Management  in  the  Ethiopian  Highlands  and  its  Impact  on  Downstream 
Stakeholders Dependent on the Blue research being carried out in Ethiopia and Sudan, a 
project of the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food. This paper is a result of 
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